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Abstract
The existence of an inverse limit of an inverse system of (probabil-
ity) measure spaces has been investigated since the very beginning of
the birth of the modern probability theory. Results from Kolmogorov
[10], Bochner [2], Choksi [5], Metivier [14], Bourbaki [3] among others
have paved the way of the deep understanding of the problem under
consideration. All the above results, however, call for some topolog-
ical concepts, or at least ones which are closely related topological
ones. In this paper we investigate purely measurable inverse systems
of (probability) measure spaces, and give a sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique inverse limit. An example for the considered
purely measurable inverse systems of (probability) measure spaces is
also given.
1 Introduction
The existence of an inverse limit of an inverse system of (probability) measure
spaces is an important question in probability theory (see e.g. Kolmogorov
[10]), in the theory of stochastic processes (see e.g. Rao [18]), and in some
sense surprisingly in game theory.
∗The author thanks the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) and the Ja´nos
Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for financial support.
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On the field of game theory, actually on the subfield of games with in-
complete information, the investigation of the so called hierarchies of beliefs
– in the language of mathematics: inverse systems of (probability) measure
spaces, see Harsa´nyi [7], Mertens and Zamir [12], Brandenburger and Dekel
[4], Heifetz [8], Mertens at al. [13], Pinte´r [17] among others – calls for the
applications of certain existence results.
All the previous results – Kolmogorov, Bochner [2], Choksi [5], Metivier
[14], Bourbaki [3] among others – on the existence of an inverse limit of an
inverse system of measure spaces, however, calls for topological concepts,
various compactness concepts, even if it does not seems at first glance (see
e.g. Metivier’s result).
The case of hierarchies of beliefs is, however, a special one, it is quite
natural to consider these inverse systems of measure spaces as purely mea-
surable ones (see e.g. Heifetz and Samet [9]), so in order to examine the
existence of an inverse limit of an inverse system of measure spaces in the
purely measurable framework we need a purely measurable existence result.
The main result of this paper is Theorem 7. which provides purely mea-
surable sufficient condition for the existence of a unique inverse limit. Actu-
ally, in this paper we introduce the concept of ε-completeness (see Definition
6.), and show that it is sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence
of a unique inverse limit of an inverse system of (probability) measure spaces.
In our opinion, this result is a common generalization of all the previously
cited results (Kolmogorov, Bochner, Choksi, Metivier, Bourbaki), and we
discuss it in more detail after Theorem 7.
The mathematical core of a game theoretical problem, Proposition 11., as
an example for a class of ε-complete inverse systems of (probability) measure
spaces, is also given.
The setup is as follows. In the next section we provide some basic con-
cepts of inverse systems and inverse limits. In Section 3. we present our
main result, and Section 4. is about the above mentioned example for the
application of our main result. In the last section we mention some obvious
generalizations, and conclude briefly.
2 Inverse systems, inverse limits
First some notions and notations. In this paper we work with probability
measures, hence if we do not indicate differently we mean every measure is
a probability measure.
Let A be an arbitrary set, then #A is for the cardinality of set A. For
any A ⊆ P(X): σ(A) is the coarsest σ-field which contains A. Let (X,M)
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and (Y,N ) be arbitrary measurable spaces. Then (X×Y,M⊗N ) or briefly
X ⊗ Y is the measurable space on the set X × Y equipped by the σ-field
σ({A×B | A ∈M, B ∈ N}).
Let A ⊆ P(X ) be a set ring, C ⊆ A, µ additive set function on A; µ is
C-regular if for arbitrary  > 0 and for arbitrary A ∈ A, ∃C ∈ C such that
C ⊆ A and µ(A \ C) < .
Set system A ⊆ P(X) is a σ-compact set system, if for any {An} ⊆ A:⋂
n
An = ∅ implies that ∃n∗ s. t.
n∗⋃
n=1
An = ∅.
Let (X,M, µ) be an arbitrarily fixed (probability) measure space. Then
the set function µ∗ on P(X) is defined as follows: ∀A ∈ P(X): µ∗(A) $
inf
A⊆B∈M
µ(B) (therefore µ∗ is an outer measure).
For any topological space (X, τ): B(X, τ) is for the Borel σ-field.
We say the measurable spaces (X,M) and (Y,N ) are measurable iso-
morphic if there is such a bijection f between them that both f and f−1 are
measurable.
Next, we discuss the basic concepts of inverse systems and inverse limits.
Definition 1. Let (I,≤) be a preordered set, (Xi)i∈I be a family of nonvoid
sets, and ∀i, j ∈ i s.t. i ≤ j: fij : Xj → Xi. The system (Xi, (I,≤), fij) is
an inverse system if it meets the following points, ∀i, j, k ∈ I s.t. i ≤ j and
j ≤ k:
1. fii = idXi,
2. fik = fij ◦ fjk.
The inverse system (projective system) is a system of sets connected in a
certain way.
Definition 2. Let ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij) be such an inverse system that
∀i ∈ I: (Xi,Ai, µi) is a measure space. The inverse system ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤
), fij) is an inverse system of measure spaces if it meets the following points,
∀i, j ∈ I s.t. i ≤ j:
1. fij is a Aj-measurable function,
2. µi = µj ◦ f−1ij .
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Definition 3. Let (Xi, (I,≤), fij) be an inverse system. Let X $ ∏
i∈I
Xi,
and P $ {x ∈ X | pri(x) = fij ◦ prj(x), ∀(i ≤ j)}, where ∀i ∈ I: pri is the
coordinate projection from X to Xi.
Then P is called the inverse limit of the inverse system (Xi, (I,≤), fij),
and it is denoted by lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij).
Moreover, let pi $ pri|P , so ∀i.j ∈ I s.t. i ≤ j: pi = fij ◦ pj.
The inverse limit is the generalization of the Cartesian product. If ≤ in
(I,≤) is the empty relation, then the inverse limit is the Cartesian product.
Definition 4. Let ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij) be an inverse system of measure
spaces, and P $ lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij). Then the (P,A, µ) measure space is the
inverse limit of the inverse system of measure spaces ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij)
and it is denoted by (P,A, µ) $ lim←−((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij|i≤j). if it meets
the following points, ∀i ∈ I:
1. A is the coarsest σ-algebra w.r.t. pi is A-measurable,
2. µ is such a measure that µ ◦ p−1i = µi.
Kolmogorov’s [10] extension theorem is an inverse limit result. It states
the following: let consider a family of finite dimensional distributions on Rd
(d < ∞) s.t. they are consistent, i.e. ∀n: µn on (Rn, B(Rn) is the marginal
distribution of µn+1 on (Rn+1, B(Rn+1)). Then there exists such a unique
distribution µ on (RN, B(RN)) that ∀n: µn is the marginal distribution of µ.
This theorem is called the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem. In this case the
inverse system of measure spaces is as follows: ((Rn, B(Rn), µn),N, prmn),
where prmn : Rn → Rm is a coordinate projection. Therefore, the Kol-
mogorov Extension Theorem states that lim←−((R
n, B(Rn), µn),N, prmn) exists
and is unique.
Since if lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij) 6= ∅ then
⋃
i
p−1i (Mi) is an algebra (field), and
set function µ defined on
⋃
i
p−1i (Mi) as ∀i ∈ I: µ ◦ p−1i = µi is an additive
set function, the main problem of the existence of measure inverse limit is
the σ-additivity of µ.
Numerous results discuss this problem, the most important ones are as
follows: Kolmogorov, Bochner [2], Choksi’s [5], Millington and Sion [15],
Metivier’s [14], Mallory and Sion’s [11], Bourbaki’s [3]. The next theorem is
a variant of Metivier’s result, which can be considered as the most general
one, at least in this framework, among the above result
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Theorem 5 (Metivier). Let ((Xn,Mn, µn),N, fmn) be an inverse system of
(probability) measure spaces1. If ∀m,n ∈ N s.t. m ≤ n:
1. Cn ⊆Mn is σ-compact set system,
2. fmn is a surjective (onto) function,
3. fmn(Cn) ⊆ Cm ,
4. ∀xm ∈ Xm: f−1mn({xm}) ∩ Cn is σ-compact set system,
5. ∀Ck ∈ Cn, k ∈ N: ⋂
k
Ck ∈ Cn ,
6. µn is Cn-regular,
then
(X,M, µ) $ lim←−((Xn,Mn, µn),N, fmn|m≤n)
exists and is unique, moreover µ is C-regular, where C consists of such sets
that ∀C ∈ C: ∃Cn ∈ Cn s.t. ∀n: f−1nn+1(Cn) ⊆ Cn+1 and C = lim←−(Cn,N, fmn),
and C is σ-compact set system.
Proof. See Metivier 3.2. Theoreme pp. 269–270. Q.E.D.
Notice that in the ”classical” Kolmogorov Extension Theorem the inverses
system of measure spaces ((Rn, B(Rn), µn),N, prmn) meets the condition of
the above theorem.
3 The general result
The key notion of the paper:
Definition 6. The inverse system of measure spaces ((Xn,Mn, µn),N, fmn)
is ε - complete, if ∀ε ∈ [0, 1], ∀(m ≤ n), and ∀A ⊆ Xm:
(µ∗n(f
−1
mn(A)) = ε)⇒ (µ∗m(A) = ε) .
1Metivier’s assumption is weaker, he requires that the measures should be non-negative
σ-finite measures, and the index set is s.t. that has countable cofinal subset.
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It is a slight calculation to verify that Halmos’ [6] example (exercise (3)
pp. 214–215) is not an ε-complete inverse system of measure spaces. Further-
more, the reader may wonder whether it is enough to weaken ε-completeness
for the case of ε = 0. The answer is ”not,” if we manipulate Halmos’ above
mentioned example in such a way that the diagonal has 1− ε measure, and
the set of the off diagonal elements has ε (we distort Halmos’ example by
ε), then we get at an 0-complete inverse system of measure spaces having no
inverse limit.
A further feature, the ε-completeness is not necessary condition for the
existence of inverse limit. For this fact see the following inverse system of
measure spaces:
(([0,
1
n+ 1
), {∅, [0, 1
n+ 1
)}, δ0),N, id0, 1
n+1
)) , (1)
where δ0 is for the Dirac measure concentrated at point 0. It is easy to
verify that (1) is an inverse system of measure spaces and its inverse limit is
({0}, {∅, {0}}, δ0). However, (1) is not ε-complete.
The next theorem is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 7. Let ((Xn,Mn, µn),N, fmn) be an ε-complete inverse system of
measure spaces. Then (X,M, µ) $ lim←−((Xn,Mn, µn),N, fmn) exists and is
unique.
Proof. (1) X $ lim←−(Xn,N, fmn) 6= ∅: ∀n: let
Qn $ {x ∈ X0 | f−10n ({x}) = ∅} .
It is clear that ∀n: Qn ⊆ Qn+1.
From ε-completeness ∀n:
µ∗0(Qn) = 0 ,
hence
µ∗0(
⋃
n
Qn) = 0 ,
therefore
{(
⋃
n
Qn) 6= ∅ .
Finally, from the definition of {Qn}n, ∀x0 ∈ {(⋃
n
Qn): ∃x ∈ X such that
x0 = p0(x), where p0 : X → X0 is the canonical projection.
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(2)
⋃
n
p−1n (Mn) is a field, and µ is an additive set function on it: From
point (1)
⋃
n
p−1n (Mn) is a field.
∀A ∈ ⋃
n
p−1n (Mn): let
µ(A) $ µn(Aˆ) ,
where n and Aˆ ∈Mn are such that A = p−1n (Aˆ).
Let Aˆ ∈ Mm and Bˆ ∈ Mm′ be such that p−1m (Aˆ) = p−1m′ (Bˆ). Then ∃n∗:
n∗ ≥ m and n∗ ≥ m′, and ∀n ≥ n∗: let
Q′n $ {x ∈ Xn∗ | f−1n∗n({x}) = ∅} .
It is clear that ∀n ≥ n∗: Q′n ⊆ Q′n+1.
From ε-completeness ∀n ≥ n∗:
µ∗n∗(Q
′
n) = 0 ,
therefore
µ∗n∗(
⋃
n≥n∗
Q′n) = 0 .
p−1m (Aˆ) = p
−1
m′ (Bˆ) implies that
f−1mn∗(Aˆ)4 f−1m′n∗(Bˆ) ⊆
⋃
n≥n∗
Q′n ,
where4 is for the symmetric difference. Put it differently f−1nn∗(Aˆ)4f−1m′n∗(Bˆ) ∈
Mn∗ and µn∗(f−1mn∗(Aˆ)4 f−1m′n∗(Bˆ)) = 0. Then
µm(Aˆ) = µm′(Bˆ) ,
i.e. µ is well-defined (unique).
By repeating the above reasoning we get at that µ is additive.
(3) µ is σ-additive: Let {An}n, ∀n: An ∈Mn be such sets that f−1nn+1(An) ⊇
An+1, and
⋂
n
p−1n (An) = ∅ (i.e. we show that µ is upper σ-continuous at ∅).
∀n: let
Ln $ {x ∈ A0 | f−10n ({x}) ∩ An = ∅} .
It is clear that ∀n: Ln ⊆ Ln+1.
Since ∀n: f−1nn+1(An) ⊇ An+1, therefore ∀n:
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f−10n (Ln) ⊆ f−10n (A0) \ An ,
hence
µ∗n(f
−1
0n (Ln)) ≤ µ0(A0)− µn(An) .
ε-completeness implies that ∀n:
µ∗0(Ln) ≤ µ0(A0)− µn(An) .
{µn(An)}n is a bounded monotonic decreasing sequence of real numbers,
hence it is convergent. µ0 is a probability measure, hence
µ∗0(
⋃
n
Ln) = lim
n→∞µ
∗
0(Ln) ≤ µ0(A0)− limn→∞µn(An) .
From the definition of {An}n, ⋂
n
p−1n (An) = ∅, hence limn→∞Ln = A0:
µ∗0(
⋃
n
Ln) = µ0(A0), moreover, from point (2): ∀n: µ(p−1n (An)) $ µn(An),
hence
µ(p−1n (An))→ 0 .
(4) The extension of µ: From point (3) µ is a probability measure on the
field
⋃
n
p−1n (Mn), hence it can be uniquely extended ontoM $ σ(
⋃
n
p−1n (Mn)).
Q.E.D.
Remark 8. It is worth noticing that the conditions of Metivier’s theorem
(Theorem 5.) imply that the considered inverse system of measure spaces is
ε-complete.
Let n ∈ N and A ⊆ Xn be arbitrarily fixed, and ε $ µ∗n+1(f−1nn+1(A)).
Since Mn+1 is a σ-field, ∃B ∈M s.t. B ⊆ {f−1nn+1(A) and µn+1(B) = 1− ε.
From point 6. of Theorem 5. ∃{Cm} ⊆ Cn+1 s.t. ∀m: Cm ⊆ B and
lim
m→∞µn+1(Cm) = 1− ε.
From points 2. and 3. of Theorem 5. ∀m: fnn+1(Cm) ∈ Mn and
µn(fnn+1(Cm)) ≥ µn+1(Cm).
Since f−1nn+1({A) = {f−1nn+1(A), ∀m: fnn+1(Cm) ⊆ {A, and limm→∞µn+1(Cm) =
1− ε implies that µ∗(A) = ε.
At first glance it seems that Theorem 7. requires much less than Theorem
5., but it provides the same result. From the viewpoint of the existence of a
unique inverse limit of an inverse system of measure spaces it is true, however,
genererally we can say only that while all the previous results require more
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(Theorem 5. is included) they also provide more, they state not only that
the inverse limit exists and is unique, but they characterize it. On the other
hand, the characterization is used in their proofs.
4 An example
First we introduce the measurable structure used in this section.
Definition 9. Let (X,M) be arbitrarily fixed measurable space, and denote
∆(X,M) the set of the probability measures on it. Then the σ-field A∗ on
∆(X,M) is defined as follows:
A∗ $ σ({{µ ∈ ∆(X,M) | µ(A) ≥ p}, A ∈M, p ∈ [0, 1]}) .
In other words
A∗ $ σ( ⋃
A∈M
pr−1A (B([0, 1]))) ,
where prA : [0, 1]
M|∆(X,M) → [0, 1]A, [0, 1]A is the A copy of [0, 1]M, and
B([0, 1]) is for the Borel σ-field on [0, 1].
The A∗ σ-field is specially interesting in interactive epistemology. Games
with incomplete information are such games where the players are uncertain
about some parameters of the game (the description of the game). In such
games it is a cardinal problem that what the players believe about the game,
and what the players believe about the other players’ beliefs about the game
an so on. Interactive epistemology is on this problem, it deals with the
players’ beliefs and knowledge. It is usual in the literature that the players’
beliefs are modeled by probability measures.
In order to talk about the players’ beliefs we need sentences like player i
believe with at least probability α that event A happens (see e.g. Aumann
[1], Heifetz and Samet [9]). This requirement is formalized in Definition 9.
More precisely, the σ-field in Definition 9. is the weakest σ-field among those
meet the above requirement, where the events (of the base space) are ofM.
Notice that A∗ is not a fixed σ-field, it depends on the measurable space
on which the probability measures are defined. Therefore A∗ is similar to the
weak∗ topology which depends on the topology of the base (primal) space.
Henceforth the non-written σ-fields are the A∗ σ-fields.
The following diagram introduces the mathematical problem considered
in this section. Altough Mertens et al.’s [13] consider topological spaces
and Borel σ-fields, and compact regular measures, and our model is purely
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measurable the following formalization of the problem conceptually comes
from Mertens et al.’s paper.
Definition 10. In diagram (2)
Θi ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i})
Θin+1
pin+1
?
$ ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}n )
idS
?
pN\{i}n
?
Θin
qinn+1
?
$ ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}n−1 )
idS
?
q
N\{i}
n−1n
?
(2)
• N is an arbitrary set,
• i ∈ N is an arbitrarily element of N ,
• n ∈ N,
• (S,A) is an arbitrary measurable space,
moreover ∀j ∈ N :
• #Θj−1 = 1,
• qj−10 : Θj0 → Θj−1,
• ∀n ∈ N ∪ {−1}: ΘN\{j}n $
⊗
k∈N\{j}
Θkn,
• ∀m,n ∈ N, m ≤ n, ∀µ ∈ Θjn:
qjmn(µ) $ µ|S⊗ΘN\{j}m−1 ,
therefore qjmn is a measurable mapping.
• Θj $ lim←−(Θ
j
n,N ∪ {−1}, qjmn),
• ∀n ∈ N ∪ {−1}: pjn : Θj → Θjn is canonical projection,
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• ∀m,n ∈ N ∪ {−1}, m ≤ n: qN\{j}mn is the product of the mappings qkmn,
k ∈ N \{j}, and so is pN\{j}n of pkn, k ∈ N \{j}, therefore both mappings
are measurable,
• ΘN\{j} $ ⊗
k∈N\{j}
Θk.
Let me give some intuitions what the above definition is about. Let i be
an arbitrary player and (S,A) be the parameter space. The paramer space
can be interpreted as the space that contains every parameter of the game
(e.g. payoffs, etc.). Then Θi1 is the space of the so called first order beliefs
of player i, i.e. this consists of player i’s beliefs about the parameters of the
game.
We assume that every player knows her own beliefs, so does player i,
therefore it is enough to focus on the beliefs of players not i. Then Θi2 is
the space of the so called second order beliefs of player i, i.e. this consists
of player i’s beliefs about the other players’ beliefs about parameters of the
game. In the same way we can interpret Θin as the space of player i’s nth
order beliefs. Finally ΘN consists of every player’s every hierarchy of beliefs
i.e. of every player’s arbitrary high order beliefs.
In this framework the goal is to ”construct” an object, so called type
space (see Heifetz and Samet), which consists of the parameters and all the
hierarchies of all players, and for any player i, and for any probability measure
µ on S ⊗ΘN\{i} there exists θi ∈ Θi s.t.
(S ⊗ΘN\{i}, µ) = ((S ⊗ΘN\{i}n , pin+1(θi)),N ∪ {−1}, (idS, qN\{i}mn )) .
An object having the above property is an ideal one for the propurses of
game theory.
The following proposition formalizes the above discussed goal. Since every
previous result on this problem – Mertens and Zamir [12], Brandenburger
and Dekel [4], Heifetz [8], Mertens at al., Pinte´r [17] among others – applies
topological assumptions and ours do not, the next result is new.
Proposition 11. ∀i ∈ N : Θi = ∆(S ⊗ ΘN\{i}), i.e. they are measurable
isomorphic.
It is easy to verify that all we need to prove is that ∀i ∈ N , ∀θi ∈ Θi: the
inverse system of measure spaces
((S ⊗ΘN\{i}n , pin+1(θi)),N ∪ {−1}, (idS, qN\{i}mn )) (3)
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admits a unique inverse limit, where (idS, q
N\{i}
mn ) is the product of the given
mappings.
In order to apply Theorem 7. we need the following result.
Lemma 12. Let (X,M1) and (X,M2) be such measurable spaces thatM1 ⊆
M2, and f : ∆(X,M2)→ ∆(X,M1) be defined as ∀ν ∈ ∆(X,M2):
f(ν) $ ν|(X,M1) .
Moreover, let µ2 be an arbitrary measure on ∆(X,M2) and µ1 $ µ2|∆(X,M1).
Then ∀A ⊆ ∆(X,M1), ∀ε ∈ [0, 1]:
(µ∗2(f
−1(A)) = ε)⇒ (µ∗1(A) = ε) .
Proof. Let A ⊆ ∆(X,M1) and ε ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrarily fixed. Then it is slight
calculation to verify that
f−1(A) = (
⋂
B∈M1
pr−1B ({ν(B) | ν ∈ A})) ∩ (
⋂
B∈M2\M1
pr−1B ([(lB, uB)])) , (4)
where lB $ sup
B⊇C∈M1
inf
ν∈A
ν(C), uB $ inf
B⊆D∈M1
sup
ν∈A
ν(D),
[(lB, uB)] $

(lB, uB),
if ∀ν ∈ A, ∀C,D ∈M1, C ⊆ B, B ⊆ D :
ν(C) < lB and uB < ν(D)
[lB, uB),
if ∃ν ∈ A, ∃C ∈M1, C ⊆ B : lB = ν(C),
and ∀ν ∈ A, ∀D ∈M1, B ⊆ D : uB < ν(D)
(lB, uB],
if ∀ν ∈ A, ∀C ∈M1, C ⊆ B : ν(C) < lB,
and ∃ν ∈ A, ∃D ∈M1, B ⊆ D : uB = ν(D)
[lB, uB],
if ∃ν, ν ′ ∈ A, ∃C,D ∈M1, C ⊆ B, B ⊆ D :
lB = ν(C) and uB = ν
′(D)
,
and prB : [0, 1]
M2 |∆(X,M2) → [0, 1]B.
∀B ∈ M2 \M1: let LB, UB ∈ M1 be such that LB ⊆ B, B ⊆ UB, and
lB = inf
ν∈A
ν(LB), uB = sup
ν∈A
ν(UB) (M1 is a σ-field, so there are such sets).
Then ∀B ∈M2 \M1:
f−1(A) ⊆ pr−1LB([(lB, 1]) ∩ pr−1UB([0, uB)]) ⊆ pr−1B ([(lB, uB)]) . (5)
Put the above term differently, pr−1LB([(lB, 1]) ∩ pr−1UB([0, uB)]) is not worse in
approximating f−1(A) via B than pr−1B ([(lB, uB)]).
Therefore, from Definition 9. and equation (4): if µ∗2(f
−1(A)) = ε then
∃{Cn}n ⊆M1 and ∃{Dm}m ⊆M2 \M1:
12
f−1(A) ⊆ (⋂
n
pr−1Cn(BCn)) ∩ (
⋂
m
pr−1Dm([(lDm , uDm)])) ,
and
µ2(
⋂
n
pr−1Cn(BCn)) ∩ (
⋂
m
pr−1Dm([(lDm , uDm)])) = ε ,
where BCn ∈ B([0, 1]) (Borel set of [0, 1]).
(5) implies that ∃{Kn}n ⊆M1:
f−1(A) ⊆⋂
n
pr−1Kn(BKn) ,
(BKn ∈ B([0, 1])) and
µ2(
⋂
n
pr−1Kn(BKn)) = ε ,
i.e.
A ⊆⋂
n
prr−1Kn(BKn) and µ1(
⋂
n
prr−1Kn(BKn)) = ε ,
where prrKn : [0, 1]
M1|∆(X,M1) → [0, 1]Kn . Therefore µ∗2(f−1(A)) = ε implies
that
µ∗1(A) = ε .
Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 11. Lemma 12., j ∈ and n ∈ N are arbitrarily fixed,
(X,M1) $ S⊗ΘN\{j}n−1 , (X,M2) $ S⊗ΘN\{j}n , µ2 is an arbitrary measure of
Θjn+1 $ ∆(X,M2), f $ qjnn+1. The case of qj−10 is trivial, finally if ∀j ∈ N :
qjnn+1 meets the given property then so does (idS, q
N\{i}
nn+1 )., implies that the
inverse system of measure spaces (3) is ε-complete, so from Theorem 7. it
has a unique inverse limit, i.e. ∀i ∈ N :
Θi = ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}) .
Q.E.D.
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5 Final remarks
We give two straightforward generalizations of Theorem 7. Henceforth we
assume that (I,≤) is a right directed set.
A notion: Bochner [2] introduced the concept of sequential maximality,
later Millington and Sion [15] ”weakened” it, and got at the concept of almost
sequential maximality.
Definition 13. The inverse system of measure spaces ((Xi,Mi, µi), (I,≤
), fij) is almost sequentially maximal (a.s.m.) , if ∀i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ∈ I chains
∃Ain ⊆ Xin:
• ∀(n ≤ m): f−1inim(Ain) ⊆ Aim,
• ∀n: µ∗in(Ain) = 0,
• (∀n : xin ∈ (Xin \ Ain) and xin = finin+1(xin+1)) ⇒ (∃x ∈ lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij) such that ∀n : xin = pin(x)) .
The first generalization:
Theorem 14. Let ((Xi,Mi, µi), (I,≤), fij) be such an inverse system of
measure spaces that is
1. almost sequentially maximal,
2. ε-complete.
Then lim←−((Xi,Mi, µi), (I,≤), fij) exists and unique.
An other generalization:
Theorem 15. Let ((Xi,Mi, µi), (I,≤), fij) be such an inverse system of
measure spaces that (is)
1. (I,≤) has countable cofinal subset,
2. ε-complete.
Then lim←−((Xi,Mi, µi), (I,≤), fij) exists and unique.
The two above theorems are direct corollaries of Theorem 7.
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